Impreza combines native onion publishing, client authorization, identity controls and application protection with portal, REST API and MCP operations. This update brings the available Tor workflow together with Shield v2 and the MCP capabilities released on October 5, 2026.
What is available
- Native onion publishing: publish supported Agent-managed applications with a Tor v3 address, including custom applications. Branch previews can use protected onion access on eligible deployments.
- Onion access and identity: manage authorized Tor clients and protection profiles, import a supported identity or request an export encrypted for your recipient key. Keep identity recovery separate from application backups.
- Shield v2: inspect aggregate WAF outcomes and matching rules, review supported exclusions and tune browser challenges, request limits and temporary under-attack mode.
- Account overview:
impreza_get_account_overviewreturns a consolidated view bounded by the current credential's permissions and resource restrictions. - Five MCP prompts: guided workflows for Git publication, domain changes, deployment diagnosis, backup restoration and Agent updates. Prompt support depends on the client. Retrieving a prompt executes no operation and grants no authority.
- Reversible Agent pause: pause and resume through the supported controls. Pausing does not cancel work already dispatched and is not a server shutdown.
The local MCP package 0.47.0 includes these workflows and the Shield/readiness read tools. Update explicitly if you use a local package. Hosted MCP, local packages and server Agents have separate release and capability requirements.
Three separate Tor paths
| Path | Purpose and boundary |
|---|---|
| Inbound onion service | Visitors reach the app through Tor. Client authorization is optional and separate from application authentication. |
| Management over Tor | A Tor-capable client reaches the portal, REST API or hosted MCP onion endpoint. An AI provider still receives the prompts and results shared with it. |
| Application runtime egress | Eligible new custom deployments can isolate outbound TCP through Tor. Requires the advertised capability, Docker Engine 28+ and an application client using SOCKS with remote DNS. Image pulls, source retrieval and builds are outside this runtime option. |
Hosted MCP over Tor: http://mcp.imprezareshna326gqgmbdzwmnad2wnjmeowh45bs2buxarh5qummjad.onion/mcp. Use a Tor-capable client and the documented OAuth discovery flow. Find the other endpoints in the official address reference.
Configure Shield v2 deliberately
Update the Agent explicitly to 0.6.27+ and verify the reported shield-v2 and shield-v2-controls capabilities. Read the current policy through My Apps, impreza_get_shield or the REST API before requesting changes.
Policy writes use base_revision. Refresh and review after a revision conflict. Supported detection-rule exclusions return the WAF to audit and require a new enforcement confirmation. The standard profile observes; WAF blocking on stronger profiles requires explicit confirmation.
Adjust pow_paths, rate_limit_rpm and pow_difficulty for the actual application clients. Path entries are prefixes. Trusted clearnet sources bypass challenges and request limits, not the WAF; that exemption does not apply to onion routes. Under-attack mode lasts 1–24 hours and returns locally to the base policy at its deadline.
A browser challenge requires JavaScript and may prevent a webhook or API client from working. Verify legitimate traffic and the operation's final result. Shield provides L7 protection and aggregate telemetry, not volumetric DDoS absorption. Tor daemon protection profiles and Shield web protection are separate controls.
Shield fields and limits · Guided Shield setup
Operational controls around deployment
Use limited credentials and human approvals for selected changes. For eligible stateless custom web apps, readiness-based redeploy can check the next version before moving its managed route. It requires Agent 0.6.27+ and does not guarantee uninterrupted connections. It is separate from moving an application between servers.
For onion client authorization, review the effect of revocation: removing the final authorized client makes the service public to Tor visitors. Client-policy changes can restart the shared Tor daemon and interrupt onion connections on that server.
Update — October 10, 2026
Jurisdiction Failover now supports the reviewed Memos 0.31.0 and Uptime Kuma 2.5.5 catalog builds, with an Impreza-managed hostname and a cold standby on another eligible server you own. Restore and verify the copy, then review and explicitly confirm the transfer. A supported public onion can accompany the managed hostname. Customer-domain cutover, private onion migration and automatic health-based promotion remain outside this workflow.
For Uptime Kuma, check the restored monitors and notification settings after the move. A completed backup defines the recovery point; later writes can be lost and the transfer can interrupt service. Follow the updated guide and compatibility limits.
The original October 5 announcement below introduced Tor and Shield workflows; failover was still in preparation on that date.
